



**SECURITY ADVISORY**

**Authentication bypass in Danfoss  
System-Managers model SM800 &  
SC255/SC355 firmware versions  $\leq$   
v08.095.008**

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A decorative graphic at the bottom of the page consists of a series of wavy, overlapping lines of red dots, creating a sense of motion and depth against the dark background.

# Vulnerabilities description

## Issue

Synacktiv discovered an authentication bypass on the firmware version 08.095.008 of SM800 and SC255/SC355 devices.

## Timeline

Date	Description
2023.02.28	Advisory sent to <a href="mailto:security@danfoss.com">security@danfoss.com</a>
2023.03.13	Danfoss acknowledges the report but indicates this vulnerability only affects EOL products SM800 and SC255. Network protection countermeasures have been defined together with a customer notification.
2023.05.22	Public release
2023.09.08	Danfoss notification about wrong statements in the advisory
2023.10.31	Update of the advisory with Danfoss recommendation

## Mitigations

Restrict network access to the affected products.

# Technical description

## Description

To authenticate on the SM800 device, apart from the username/password combination, a per-day code can also be used if the **eds\_only** or **quantum\_only** attributes are present in the XML request.

```
unsigned __int8 __cdecl xml_load_file(ezxml_t xml, ATTR_LIST attrlist, unsigned __int8
from_subtree)
{
    // [...]
    eds_only = 0;
    em800_only = 0;
    quantum_only = 0;
    if ( from_subtree )
        goto LABEL_12;
    if ( attrlist[318].attr_exist )
    {
        eds_only = atoi((const char *)attrlist[318].attr_value);
        is_auth = check_authorize(xml, attrlist); // call check_code_of_day>Password)
        xml_auth = is_auth;
    }
    else if ( attrlist[319].attr_exist )
    {
        quantum_only = atoi((const char *)attrlist[319].attr_value);
        is_auth = check_authorize(xml, attrlist); // call check_code_of_day>Password)
        xml_auth = is_auth;
    }
    // [...]
    if ( xml_auth > 0 )
    {
        // [...]
    }
    else
    {
        resp_error = 15;
        return 0;
    }
}
```

However, the `check_code_of_day` function, responsible for this authentication mechanism, only relies on the date of the day.

```
unsigned __int8 __cdecl check_code_of_day(LPCTSTR pass)
{
    // [...]
    Get_syst_current_tds(&date);
    ftext_s(buff, 511, "%02d%02d%02d%02d", date.month, date.day, date.year, date.month);
    sscanf((const char *)buff, "%lx", &tohex);
    ftext_s(buff, 511, "%02d", date.day);
    sscanf((const char *)buff, "%lx", &hex);
    tohex /= hex;
    ftext_s(buff, 511, "%05ld", tohex - &elf_gnu_hash_bucket[6455] * (tohex / 100000));
    return pass[0] == buff[0] &&
           pass[1] == buff[1] &&
           pass[2] == buff[2] &&
           pass[3] == buff[3] &&
           pass[4] == buff[4];
}
```

## Impact

It is therefore possible to forge arbitrary codes, as the needed information is returned by the `read_date_time` function accessible without authentication.

```
$ curl -k -d '<cmd action="read_date_time"/>' https://92.66.59.91:443/xml.cgi
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<resp action="read_date_time" error="0">
  <year>23</year>
  <month>2</month>
  <day>10</day>
  [...]
</resp>
```

With this code, an attacker could access the authenticated features of the application.



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