


Say Hello to your new cache flow WHFB and Entra ID Troopers 2024





- **Rémi Jullian**
- @netsecurity1

PERS

Reverse engineering

- **Geoffrey Bertoli**
- @yofbalibump
- Pentest

Who are we





- Théo Gordyjan
- @___t0___
- Pentest



<u>Who</u> are we

Synacktiv

- Offensive security company based in France
- 170 Experts
- Pentest / Red Team Reverse Engineering / Vulnerability research – Development - Incident Response
- Hexacon in Paris (October)







- WHFB and Microsoft Entra ID
- Cached data format
- Cached data for offline authentication
- Demo
- A word on DPAPI
- Conclusion

TROOPERS





SYNACKTIV

Started during a pentest

- Audit of the laptops (client wants to know what could be achieved if computer stolen)
- Bitlocker + TPM but no PIN during boot process
 - Sniffing bitlocker key
 - Decrypt disk to erase the local admin password
- WHFB installed + Entra ID environment => no mscache





• Can we have an authenticated access on the domain?

Previous users have been authenticated on the domain with the computer => cache file somewhere







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Windows Hello For Business != Windows Hello

- WH => Authentication with a Microsoft account or an Identity provider or relying party services supporting Fast ID Online v2.0 authentication.
- Users can create a PIN or biometric gesture on their personal devices for convenient sign-in.
- These options make it easier and safer to sign in to computers as it can be backed up for recovery with a Microsoft account.



Authentication types

- Windows Hello Face
- Windows Hello Fingerprint
- Windows Hello PIN
- Physical security key



. . .

SYNACKTIV




Windows Hello

- If you want to retrieve a password when someone is using WH:
 - The SAM hive is no longer used.
 - The final goal is to decrypt a file containing the user password. The file can be a vault or directly a registry key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\ Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\LogonUI\NgcPin\ Credentials\S-1-5-21-xxx\encryptedPassword.







 https://www.insecurity.be/blog/2020/12/24/dpapi-in-depth-withtooling-standalone-dpapi/



Windows Hello For Business != Windows Hello

- WHFB => Authentication with a Microsoft Entra ID account, an Active Directory account or an IdP / RP
- Uses key-based or certificate-based authentication.





Registration process WHFB / Entra ID


- After joining a Microsoft Entra ID tenant, reboot and registration process.
- Creation of a PIN
- Public/Private key generated, and the PIN is an entropy used to protect the private key

Use Windows Hello with your account	
Your organisation requires you to set up your work or school account with Windows Hello Face, Fingerprint or PIN.	
If you've already set up Windows Hello on this device, we'll automatically add it for this account. You may be asked to re-verify with Windows Hello.	
If your organisation requires a more complex PIN, Windows will prompt you to change it.	
	ОК




Registration process WHFB / Entra ID

- TPM: PIN used to access the private key stored in the TPM
 => tamper protection of the TPM provided.
- Without TPM: same process, but everything is on the filesystem
 => no tamper protection



TROOPERS

Authentication process WHFB / Entra ID with a TPM



https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/how-it-works-authentication

SYNACKTIV



Authentication process WHFB / Entra ID

- PRT
 - Key artifact of Microsoft Entra ID authentication.
 - => Can be seen as a TGT in Active Directory. Used to sign in a user on their Entra ID device and connected resources.
 - When a PRT is issued, Entra ID issues an encrypted session key to the device. It is encrypted with the public key of the device.
 - Session key => generation of a derived key => could be used to modify and re-sign PRT cookie. This allows us to use the PRT for as long as it is valid (14 days) on other systems than it was issued on.
 - https://dirkjanm.io/digging-further-into-the-primary-refresh-token/



Authentication process WHFB / Entra ID

- Cloud Authentication Provider (CloudAP)
 - Windows Authentication Package enabling users to sign in to Windows using their Entra ID or Microsoft Account.



TROOPERS



Authentication process WHFB / Entra ID

cloudAP.dll


- Lives in *lsass.exe* process' memory
- Used to authenticate a user logon attempt
- Implements the SECPKG_FUNCTION_TABLE structure
 - Mandatory for a security package
 - LSA_AP_LOGON_USER_EX2 is set to LsaApLogonUserEx2
 - Performs the authentication
- Not documented by Microsoft
 - (Some structures are documented in LSA Whisperer wiki)





What if Entra ID can not be reached ?

- The user is still able to perform local authentication
- Based on a cache file
- LsaApLogonUserEx2 is executed with LogonType = CachedInteractive











CacheData file

- %SYSTEM32%\config\systemprofile\AppData\local\microsoft\ windows\CloudAPCache\AzureAD\<unique_hash>\Cache\CacheData
- Admin privileges needed to read it



TROOPERS



One Cache folder per EntralD user

- Hash found by browsing HKLM hive and checking keys which contain user information:
 - HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\IdentityStore\LogonCache\ B16898C6-A148-4967-9171-64D755DA8520\Name2Sid

Accessed by cloudAP.dll, within lsass.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\IdentityStore\LogonCache\B16898C6-A148-4967-9171-64D755DA8520\Name2Sid\f3efc517baddb36c04711f56b0ff488397fd8a458731567bc9140c87614d4006

LogonCache	Name	Туре	Data
B16898C6-A148-4967-9171-64D755DA8520	(Default)	REG_SZ	(value not set)
 Name2Sid 4020f3c852d275a791f6b72eccb58d08f0aa251c4c f3efc517baddb36c04711f56b0ff488397fd8a45873 	ab AuthenticatingAuthority	REG_SZ	AzureAD
	ab DisplayName	REG_SZ	Théo Gordyjan
	🕮 Flags	REG_DWORD	0x00000000 (0)
Sid2Name	ab IdentityName	REG_SZ	theog@s1nresearch.onmicrosoft.com
D7F9888F-E3FC-49b0-9EA6-A85B5F392A4F	ab SAMName	REG_SZ	ThéoGordyjan
> Providers	ab) Sid	REG_SZ	S-1-12-1-1473278482-1076885373-2432020880-302



Why is it an interesting file ?

- May be used to retrieve the password and the PIN
 - Implies bruteforce attack
 - More on this later...
- May be used to obtain the PRT + User DPAPI CredKey
 - For both PIN and password
 - Only if credentials have been bruteforced successfully
 - Limited for PIN if there is a TPM



Previous work

- CacheData PRT decryption when using password
 - PRT_Utils.ps1 from AADInternals repository
- Windows Hello Ngc PIN Decryption using DPAPI
 - ngccryptokeysdec.py from dpapilab-ng repository

Our contribution

- CacheData PRT decryption for password and PIN authentication
- Increase comprehension on the CacheData file format
- Python script for bruteforcing PIN (without a TPM) or password (with or without a TPM)

TROOPERS



Methodology

 Need to reverse-engineer *cloudAP.dll* to understand authentication process and interaction with the cache file



TROOPERS

Methodology

Static analysis

- IDA + HexRays Decompiler
- Public PDB is available :)
 - Common for Microsoft built-in DLLs
 - Functions and global variables are named
- Dynamic analysis
 - Creation of a Time Travel Debugging (TTD) trace of Isass.exe using Windbg
 - Same trace can be shared among different users !
 - Each DLLs can be easily extracted for static analysis


SYNACKTIV

Simple file format

- Header with version number, GUID, sha256, number of nodes...
- Nodes headers (1 or more)
 - Type of node, size of CryptoBlob, size of EncryptedBlob
- Nodes (1 or more)

One node per authentication means

- e.g: PIN + password \rightarrow 2 nodes
- We only analyzed PIN and password auth









- Parsed by cloudAP!DeserializeCloudAPCache
 - Populates a structure of type CloudAPCache
 - With a pointer to an array of structures of tagCacheNodeldentifier
- tagCacheNodeldentifier
 - Node type
 - Ox1 : Password based authentication
 - 0x5 : Pin based authentication
 - Pointer to + size of CryptoBlob
 - Format changes according to node type
 - Pointer to + size of EncryptedBlob
 - Encrypted PRT + DPAPI CredKey

CryptoBlob when using PIN based authentication



NgcAsymetricKeyEncryptedBlob



CryptoBlob when using password based authentication

DPAPI CredKey

- Stored in a struct CREDENTIAL_KEY (0x60 bytes)
 - GUID
 - Key stored in a 0x40 bytes buffer
- Derived to decrypt latest Master Key
 - HMAC(SHA1(CredKey), USERSID_UTF16_LE, SHA1)
- Stored encrypted in the CacheData
- Protected in memory using LSA_PROTECT_MEMORY callback
 - Symetric key generated in *Isasrv*!*LsaInitializeProtectedMemory*

TROOPERS



Cached data for offline authentication





Password



<u>Cached data for offline authentication</u>

Password based authentication

- PRT is encrypted with an AES key derived from the password
- Analysing *cloud*AP!DeriveKeyFromSecret function:
 - Takes the password as an argument to create a key:
 - PBKDF2HMAC(SHA256, pwd, lengthkey=32 bytes) without salt iterating 10 000 times as for DPAPI encryption.
- Resulting key is used in AES-CBC decryption (with a null IV) on the CacheData encryptedBlob





PIN authentication



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Introduction - With a PIN

- NGC (or DPAPI-NG) used:
 - Next-Gen-Cryptography → long-term replacement for the Microsoft CryptoAPI
 - Provides a set of APIs that can be used to easily encrypt and decrypt content to authorization principals across multiple computers
 - Works with providers, protectors and items:
 - **Provider**: component responsible for managing cryptographic operations and interacting with the NGC framework. Two different types of providers: Key Storage provider or Cryptographic Service Provider
 - **Protector**: method or technique used to encrypt and protect sensitive data.



Introduction - With a PIN

- NGC
 - Location: %windir%\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Local\ Microsoft\Ngc
 - System privileges needed to access it
 - Protectors, providers and items metadata can be retrieved by parsing non-encrypted data inside it.





Introduction - With a PIN

•	NGC	
		C:\WINDOWS\SERVICEPROFILES\LOCALSERVICE\APPDATA\LOCAL\MICROSOFT\NGC
		Protectors
		1.dat 11.dat 13.dat
		15.dat 16.dat 17.dat
		18.dat 5.dat 6.dat
OPI	FRS	7.dat 8.dat 9.dat

TROOPERS



Introduction - With a PIN

NGC

{93F	F10861-19F1-42B8-AD24-93A28E9C4096} -56d07ac46c9c347e6d1ef0b0ffbd5bf3255e5edfaff4ee78ae36e7b143efdaa5 1.dat 10.dat 2.dat
	3.dat 5.dat 6.dat 8.dat 9.dat
	-967764170a8f4c3864cf33ac6bf306bb461913b909c5bd1a79137f0131818b8e 1.dat 10.dat 2.dat 3.dat 5.dat 6.dat 8.dat 9.dat

TROOPERS



Introduction - With a PIN

- Inside the root NGC folder:
 - NGC GUID folder which contains
 - User SID (1.dat)
 - Main provider (7.dat)


[!] Parsing the Ngc folder [+] NGC GUID : {BD1E1811-FFFB-4F76-850E-03DDF974D27E} [+] User SID : S-1-12-1-1473278482-1076885373-2432020880-3020655032 [+] Main Provider : Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider

https://github.com/tijldeneut/dpapilab-ng



Introduction - With a PIN

- Key Storage Providers:
 - With TPM \rightarrow Microsoft Plaftform Crypto Provider \rightarrow Protector stored in the TPM chip
 - Without TPM \rightarrow Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider \rightarrow Protector stored locally
 - Other providers exist with NGC: SmartCard Key Storage provider...




<pre>\$ python3 _ngo [] == Protectors</pre>	:_step_by_step_on_and_offline.py <ngc_folder> ==</ngc_folder>
= 1 = [+] Provider	: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider

https://github.com/tijldeneut/dpapilab-ng



Introduction - With a PIN

- Protectors:
 - NGC\<NGC_GUID>\Protectors\1\:
 - $1.dat \rightarrow Name of the protector$
 - 2.dat \rightarrow Key GUID of the protector (missing if stored on the TPM)
 - 15.dat \rightarrow Encrypted data



https://github.com/tijldeneut/dpapilab-ng

SYNACKTIV

Introduction - With a PIN

- Items:
 - NGC\<NGC_GUID>\<GUID>\:
 - Each item is stored inside a folder
 - 1.dat \rightarrow Name of the item
 - 2.dat \rightarrow Provider name

* 967764170a8f4c3864cf33ac6bf306bb461913b909c5bd1a79137f0131818b8e
[+] Name : //CA00CFA8-EB0F-42BA-A707-A3A43CDA5BD9
[+] Provider : Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider
[+] Key Name : {9B6DC1EA-F6CC-46AB-8226-67808A8494F1}

https://github.com/tijldeneut/dpapilab-ng

ΔΔ



Introduction - With a PIN







<u>PIN</u> without TPM





• Authentication with a PIN without a TPM

- A first RSA private key needs to be constructed from encrypted data (called a BCRYPT RSA Private Key Blob)
- Used to decrypt and obtain a DecryptPIN, also used to obtain a second RSA private key constructed from another BCRYPT RSA Private Key Blob.







Authentication with a PIN without a TPM

 Blobs are stored inside %windir%\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\ AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys, identified by cleartext metadata for each key.

> hexdump	- C	445	5ae1	L39e	ebd2	246a	ac64	110k	02292	2735	5fe	52 (c2e5	5701	F7-a	a2b1	-4483-b686-ab4ab03d
00000000									4c								[L
00000010	5b	01	00	00	72	02	00	00	θc	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	[[r]
00000020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	7b	00	39	00	
00000030	38	00	39	00	43	00	46	00	31	00	41	00	38	00	2d	00	8.9.C.F.1.A.8
00000040	42	00	38	00	43	00	39	00	2d	00	34	00	30	00	46	00	B.8.C.94.0.F.
00000050	41	00	2d	00	42	00	46	00	42	00	33	00	2d	00	35	00	AB.F.B.35.
0000060	31	00	43	00	43	00	37	00	46	00	45	00	38	00	36	00	1.C.C.7.F.E.8.6.
00000070	41	00	41	00	31	00	7d	00	2c	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	A.A.1.}.,
00000080	00	00	00	00	10	00	00	00	08	00	00	00	4d	00	6f	00	M.o.
00000090	64	00	69	00	66	00	69	00	65	00	64	00	ba	de	c9	b9	d.i.f.i.e.d
000000a0	af	4e	da	01	2f	01	00	00	0a	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.N/
000000b0	00	00	00	00	1b	01	00	00	52	53	41	31	00	08	00	00	RSA1
00000c0	03	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	



Authentication with a PIN without a TPM

- The first BCRYPT RSA Private Key Blob linked with NGC is decrypted using DPAPI mechanisms after multiple steps involving:
 - System masterkeys
 - GUID of the Protector
 - SYSTEM and SECURITY hives
 - The PIN <= Bruteforce here</p>
 - Static entropy strings
- A BCRYPT RSA private key is constructed using this blob (contains the Modulus, the exponent, prime1 and prime2).

https://www.insecurity.be/blog/2020/12/24/dpapi-in-depth-with-tooling-standalone-dpapi/




Authentication with a PIN without a TPM

- This private key is used to decrypt NGC data (15.dat)
 - 3 pins of 32 bits inside
 - The DecryptPIN is the one needed (the second one inside the .dat file)
- The second BCRYPT RSA Private Key Blob is decrypted using the the Key ID of the item used for WHFB (//CA00CFA8-EB0F-42BA-A707-A3A43CDA5BD9) with the same method replacing the PIN by the DecryptPIN, and the CryptoKey blob by the one linked with the Key ID of the item.
- Second BCRYPT RSA Private Key constructed (same previous method).

https://www.insecurity.be/blog/2020/12/24/dpapi-in-depth-with-tooling-standalone-dpapi/


ROOPERS



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


PRT decryption with a PIN (no TPM)

- The second BCRYPT RSA Private Key is used to encrypt an AES key (Encrypted AES Key 1)
 - Stored encrypted in the CacheData as a blob of 0x100 bytes
 - Big integer of 2048 bits (RSA Encryption + PKCS1.5 padding)







NgcAsymetricKeyEncryptedBlob




PRT decryption with a PIN (no TPM)

- This AES key is used to decrypt another AES key (Encrypted AES Key 2)
 - AES-CBC 256 with custom IV in the CacheData
 - Stored in CacheData as a blob of 0x30 bytes (AES-256 bits key + padding)







NgcAsymetricKeyEncryptedBlob




Authentication with a PIN without a TPM

- The final AES key is used to decrypt the PRT + DPAPI Cred key
 - AES-CBC 256 with (another) custom IV in the CacheData



AES Decrypt #2



TROOPERS



<u>PIN</u> with TPM



Using a PIN, the format of the CacheData cryptoBlob is the same with a TPM

- Authentication with a PIN with a TPM
 - Private key is stored on the TPM + PIN is used to access it \rightarrow bruteforce very hard
 - TPM 1.2: protection implemented by the manufacturer \rightarrow TPM chips were not equal regarding the mechanism in place.
 - TPM 2.0: TPM configured by Windows to lock after 32 authorization failures and to forget one authorization failure every 10 minutes.



• Authentication with a PIN with a TPM

PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-TPM

TpmPresent	:	True
TpmReady	:	True
TpmEnabled	:	True
<pre>FpmActivated</pre>	:	True
TpmOwned	:	True
RestartPending	:	False
ManufacturerId	:	1229081856
ManufacturerIdTxt	:	IBM
[]		
LockedOut	:	False
LockoutHealTime	:	10 minutes
LockoutCount	:	0
LockoutMax	:	31
SelfTest	:	{}

PS C:\Windows\system32> tpmtool getdeviceinformation

-TPM Present: True -TPM Version: 2.0 [...]

SYNACKTIV



<u>Dem</u>o





https://github.com/synacktiv/CacheData_decrypt

PR are welcome :)





<u>A Word on DPAPI</u>



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<u>A wo</u>rd on DPAPI

This Data Protection API (DPAPI) is a pair of function calls (CryptProtectData / CryptUnprotectData) that provide operating system-level data protection services to user and system processes.

DPAPI Master Key :

- DPAPI generates a strong key called the MasterKey.
- The MasterKey is a "strong secret"
- It is used to generate the Session Key used for encryption

<u>A wo</u>rd on DPAPI



DPAPI Master Key :


Local User	Domain User	SYSTEM
PBKDF2 (SHA1/(Pwd))	PBKDF2 (NTHASH)	Own MasterKey



<u>A word on DPAPI</u>



• What is the DPAPI Cred Key?



<u>A wo</u>rd on DPAPI



In an Entra ID environment, the DPAPI masterkeys is not derived from the password of the user

The CredKey is derived as follows and serves as the base secret to create the DPAPI masterkeys of the user: HMAC(SHA1(CredKey), USERSID_UTF16_LE, SHA1)

A PR To Diana was made to integrate it thanks to @l4x4

TROOPERS



Conclusion



<u>Con</u>clusion

WHFB with Entra ID environment

Password PIN No No TPM enabled TPM enabled Yes Offiline brute force possible to retrieve the first BCRYPT RSA Bruteforce almost Offiline brute force possible on the CacheData file impossible Private Key Blob Yes Bruteforce successful Bruteforce successful TPM enabled Yes No Live session needed to extract PRT cookie can be forged on a the session key, to finally forge your own PRT cookie. live session or offline.

SYNACKTIV

Conclusion



- More research needed to understand how it works when using other means of authentication (SmartCard...)
- The CacheData file is a goldmine
- **TPM enhances drastically security for credentials**





https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/

https://www.insecurity.be/blog/2020/12/24/dpapi-in-depth-with-tooling-standalone-dpapi/

https://github.com/tijldeneut/diana

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hellohow-it-works-authentication

https://dirkjanm.io/

https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools





https://github.com/EvanMcBroom/Isa-whisperer/blob/master/wiki/sspi/ cloudap.asciidoc#_cloudap_credkey_info

https://dirkjanm.io/digging-further-into-the-primary-refresh-token/

https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/windows-secrets-extraction-a-summary

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/seccng/cng-portal

https://github.com/tijldeneut/dpapilab-ng

https://helgeklein.com/blog/checking-windows-hello-for-business-whfb-key-storage-tpm-hardwareor-software/

TROOPERS



https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/ns-bcrypt-bcrypt_rsakey_blob

https://research.nccgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ blackhat_europe_2011_exporting_non-exportable_rsa_keys.pdf

https://github.com/synacktiv/CacheData_decrypt

https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals

https://github.com/tijldeneut/dpapilab-ng/blob/main/_ngc_step_by_step_on_and_offline.py

https://github.com/tijldeneut/dpapilab-ng/blob/main/ngccryptokeysdec.py

https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Tsarfati-Bypassing-Windows-Hello-For-Busniess-And-Pleasure.pdf

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