The Synacktiv summer challenge is back!
A strange behavior was observed by Synacktiv experts during the security assessment of a stateful firewall implementation... After few coffees & RFCs it was understood that it could be a generic issue that might affect multiple IP stacks. So... What is a strange firewall behavior ?
Opportunistic and quick review of rutorrent's overall security.
2018 has been a really tough year for BMCs! Although their attack surface was not something new (IPMI has been studied by Dan Farmer back in 2013, followed by a state-of-the-art blogpost by HD Moore), recent studies have shed light on how powerful these devices are in the servers, being able to directly access the main host memory, and how poor their code quality and software mitigations were.
Some time ago I started reversing an AMI firmware from a quite up-to-date
computer (2017/2018). While I was reversing a System Management Mode (SMM)
driver, I noticed an interesting code change: during initialization, the SMM
driver search for a SMM configuration table with a GUID named
Binder is the main IPC/RPC (Inter-Process Communication) system in Android. It allows applications to communicate with each other and it is the base of several important mechanisms in the Android environment. For instance, Android services are built on top of Binder. Message exchanged with Binder are called binder transactions, they can transport simple data such as integers but also process more complex structures like file descriptors, memory buffers or weak/strong references on objects. There are a lot of interesting Binder documentations available on the Internet but quite few details on how messages are translated from a process to another. This article tries to describe how Binder handles messages and performs translations of complex objects (file descriptors, pointers) between different processes. For this, a binder transaction will be followed from userland to the binder kernel.
For a while now, Android devices and many embedded systems have used a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to host some security functions (like hardware crypto/key, DRM, mobile payment, biometric authentication, ...). On ARM platforms, TEE are small operating systems which use the ARM TrustZone technology to isolate their execution from …
As a team of security researchers, we like poking at software and tinkering with common household objects for fun.
So, one of our researchers bought an electronic paper reader tablet, and instead of reading ebooks on the train, started having fun with it!
Detailed write-up of Grehack 2018 qualification challenge.
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