mar 13/09/2022 - 15:34A real ninja leaves no traces. However, in the Windows context, a lot of information are disseminated when performing actions and can be leveraged by DFIR analysts. Focusing on remote command execution techniques used by attackers and red-teamers, this article aims to get a collection of artifacts that can collected by analysts.
lun 20/06/2022 - 15:58During a ransomware attack, right after the ransomware was launched, we noticed the use of CCleaner as an anti-forensic tool to cover the attacker’s action. The following article aims to explore some key features of this tool from a forensic perspective. We will see how to identify the items that have been deleted and how they could be recovered. We focused on the free desktop version v6.00.9727.
mer 08/06/2022 - 11:40Thanks to Ready for IT organizers so we can shared a feedback regarding our incident response services (CSIRT Synacktiv) and red team activities. Below is a summary of the intervention.
lun 31/01/2022 - 10:45During a ransomware incident, CSIRT Synacktiv noticed that the bitlocker mechanism was used to encrypt company and user files. This blogpost does not intend to retrace the whole incident response process. The idea is to illustrate how we managed (or not) to recover encryption keys and save a few workstations from their terrible fate. The incident took place few months ago.
lun 22/11/2021 - 15:15Several materials already describe this type of attack, this document is an operational feedback from the CSIRT Synacktiv on several BEC incidents based on Microsoft 365 service. This is the part one of this publication.